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Goldilocks and the cleaning companies:  Collective coordination among 
contract cleaning companies 




Geographical proximity between firms is often believed to favour cooperation, 
mutual learning, knowledge creation as well as innovation.  From Marshall 
onwards, study after study has demonstrated that both cooperation and 
successful innovations arise from geographically proximate clusters.   
Geographers have therefore argued that ‘space matters’.  However, all too often, 
a direct line was drawn from geographical proximity to the assumption of 
cooperation, or from the existence of cooperation to the assumption of 
innovation without specifying the links between space and innovation.  This 
inevitably lead to a series of papers pointing out that proximity was not enough, 
or as Torre and Rallett put it “what does ‘being near’ someone mean” (2005: 48).  
Therefore space may be a necessary condition but it is not sufficient, ‘something 
else’ also must play a role (Gilly and Wallet 2001).  This was further followed by 
a series of papers highlighting that it may not be even a necessary condition and 
other factors count as much as spatial proximity.  We seem to have gone full 
circle, from ignoring the spatial element in economic development, through 
arguing that it is crucial, to arguing that it is not so important.   
 
A recent issue of Regional Studies (January 2005) was devoted to exploring this 
issue and the role proximity that plays in the cooperation between firms and 
their subsequent innovation performance.  Expanding on the French school, 
which holds that geographical proximity is only one form of proximity, and that 
organisational and institutional proximity are important, this issue reopens the 
proximity/innovation debate. Indeed Boschma (2005) argues that both cognitive 
and social proximity should be added to the analysis of cooperation as well as 
innovation.  We seek to add to this debate by exploring a geographically 
proximate cluster which does not cooperate.  The cluster is the contract cleaning 
industry in Dublin which not only fails to innovate but acts in ways that are 
damaging to their individual and collective interests.  Following Boschma (2005) 
we look at five dimensions of proximity: cognitive, organisational, social, 
institutional and geographical, to understand why a geographical cluster ‘does 
not cluster’. 
 
The paper draws on an EU funded research project ‘CRITICAL’ and through the 
IIIS.   2
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Introduction  
Contract cleaning companies display several features which suggest that they 
should be focus of more study. First, although it might seem an unusual choice of 
when trying to analyse how firms interact, since the industry is characterised by 
the presence of numerous atomised small firms that operate in a highly turbulent 
market, we would expect them to be cooperative, or at least to be mutually 
supportive toward each other. Second, since the cleaning industry is commonly 
acknowledged as being a low knowledge-intensive sector, characterised by low 
barriers to entry displaying high mobility of workers, high number of start-up 
firms (often as a result of spin-offs from other firms) where firms tend to 
establish their expertise mainly through learning-by-doing, we would expect 
innovation being frictionless. Third, cleaning companies are relatively a new 
phenomenon, and really only developed because of the waves of privatisation 
and contracting out from the 1980s onwards – we discuss this further below.  In 
Ireland there is also a fourth reason why contract cleaning companies are 
particularly interesting – many of the major companies in the contract cleaning 
business were recently involved in an unsuccessful court action over overtime 
payments.  This paper uses a recent paper in Regional Studies (Boschma 2005b) 
looking at the variety of ways firms can be proximate to analyse how firms 
interact in this industry.  Boschma’s paper explicitly explored innovation and the 
proximity preconditions for innovation to occur, in this paper we examine 
something far more modest – why firms do not cooperate even when it is in their 
best interest to do so. 
 
In the first part of the paper we discuss the study from which the research arises.  
Second, we discuss the history of the contract cleaning industry and the court 
case which the companies were recently involved in.  Third, we look at recent 
assumptions on proximity and finally we use this new stream of reasoning as an 
analytical framework to discuss how firms interact in the Irish case.  Finally, we 
finish by expanding on this recent debate on proximity to point out how firms 
can move from a state of hostility and suspicion to mutual cooperation.   
 
Discussion of CRITICAL 
The data for this paper is drawn from CRITICAL1.  CRITICAL is an international 
research project conducted in four European cities: Dublin, Newcastle, Tampere 
                                                 
1 Critical is funded by the European Commission's 5th Framework Programme for Research and 
Development. The research covers a three year period and work began in February 2003.   4
and Dortmund.  The project aims to understand the learning processes which 
take place within cities by examining a range of formal and informal networks 
within which learning and knowledge development take place.  For each of these 
networks approximately 10 interviews are conducted as well as an examination 
of any related literature and ethnographic data collected where possible.  One of 
the networks targeted as a main focus of analysis learning among clusters of 
firms.  In Ireland we chose the contract cleaning companies as our cluster 
because it had recently been involved in an interesting court case.  In addition to 
the interviews with key actors in the industry we were able to use previous 
research conducted in the area, and we attended a trade fair for the contract 
cleaning industry.2  In the trade fair, which was head over three days, three 
researchers conducted ethnographic work.  The trade fair allowed us to verify 
the type of relationships that characterise the industry.  Before looking at the 
court case and the relationships within the contract cleaning industry it is worth 
outlining the trajectory of the industry because we believe this is a causal factor 
in how the companies interact. 
 
Contract cleaning companies in Dublin 
Privatisation of both private and government services in Ireland has accelerated 
in the last two decades.  In this Ireland is duplicating the ‘sell-off’ of state 
services in other Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK and New Zealand.  The 
privatisation of state services has happened in many different ways.  This has 
involved the wholesale selling of state companies (Eircom in Ireland, British Steel 
in the UK), part-privatisation (the railway system in Italy), public-private 
partnerships (academy schools in the UK) and contracting out a series of ‘non-
core’ activities.  This work focuses on firms which have come into existence 
because of contracting out - the most widely used method of privatisation.   
Indeed the contracting out of cleaning has often been at the forefront of this wave 
of privatisation.  This contracting out of core services is a new phenomenon.   
While organizations have always made some use of external agents in order to, 
for instance, obtain needed labour, the peeling off of integral (if not core) services 
and marketing these is new.   
 
The push to outsource cleaning came from two sources.  In the public sector 
contracting out was seen as an application of competition policy and a free-
market ideology but was also pursued and advocated as a simple cost-cutting 
                                                 
2 Because of sensitivities over the court case a few actors refused an invitation to interview.  However, in 
the other interviews a consistent picture emerged, both of the sequence of events and the relations between 
the companies.    5
measure.  This application of free-market economics to the state sector was most 
clearly seen in Britain under Thatcher but was also a factor in Australia, New 
Zealand and the USA.  The history of contracting out of state cleaning services 
has often had an unimpressive history.  It has led to job losses, substantial 
declines in wages and conditions and, arguably, to deterioration in the quality of 
service provided.  This is partly because of the high transaction costs in 
specifying a complete contract (Boardman and Hewitt 2004).  This is particularly 
the case in hospitals and the health service where cleaning is often extremely 
specialised in nature.  This renders hospital cleaning inherently difficult to 
specify for contractual purposes and this problem has led to significant decline in 
service standards in many instances.  Cleaning of hospital theatres, for instance, 
is exacting work which cannot easily be specified unless within the context of a 
shared culture of expectations.  This has lead to problems with cross-infections 
and hospital ‘super bugs’.  Indeed there is now a move to employ specialist 
consultants and nurses on the issues of disease control as hospital bugs are on 
the increase.  In Ireland it has been less of a prominent issue and contracting out 
has been at a slower pace and with less media attention.  Nonetheless it is 
something that has been ongoing.   
 
The second impetus to contract cleaning was the ideology of concentrating on 
‘core functions’ in the private sector.  Increased competition in all sectors of the 
economy, fuelled in part by globalisation, has led companies to divide their 
activities into profit centres, so that they are able to analyse the performance of 
each activity in terms of its contribution to group profits.  They then concentrate 
on the most lucrative ‘core’ functions or activities, whilst getting rid of those 
activities that are deemed unnecessary and unprofitable.  In between there are 
activities that are necessary but not profitable, such as cleaning and so companies 
look for cheaper ways of carrying these out.  The solution is often outsourcing.  
 
In both cases (state and private sector changes) the result has been the same: a 
move to governance by contract and away from other types of governance can be 
seen (state bureaucracy and company hierarchy respectively).  These changes 
tend to have a self-reinforcing nature.  Once services have been outsourced and 
personnel have been transferred to the new company or lost through 
redundancy or wastage, the cost of re-establishing in-house provision becomes 
prohibitive, thereby strengthening the hand of the providers.  Also the ‘ethos’ 
that was associated with public sector or Fordist provision might be hard to re-
establish.  
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Both these ‘pushes’ to outsource cleaning happened in the 1980s and 1990s 
meaning that there has been an explosion of contract cleaning and the number of 
contract cleaning companies.  
 
The contract cleaning sector in Ireland is very heterogeneous and varies from 
small ‘one man’ operations to multi-service and multi-national companies.   
Partly this reflects the low-entry costs into the market, with little capital outlay 
needed to form a company and apply for contracts.  Minimum capital may be as 
small as the costs of some mops and a vacuum cleaner.  An impetuous to this 
company formation has been companies contracting out in-house cleaning to the 
existing cleaning staff, who form small one-site cleaning companies.  Thus, the 
total number of new companies created each year is high.  Companies then grow 
by acquiring more contracts and more staff to fulfil these.  However, it was 
highlighted in several interviews that many companies found it difficult 
expanding beyond the initial ‘one-man’ sole trader with 20-30 staff and making 
the leap to a private-limited company with 200 to 300 staff and a professional 
management with separate sales, HRM and supervisory personal.  Thus many 
companies stay small and in addition many companies go bust each year.  Also 
there is an increasing trend of larger companies buying up the smaller companies 
to get a foot hold in the Irish market.  This means that while many cleaning 
companies have been created over the last two decades the total number has 
remained relatively stable.  
 
There are over 300 cleaning companies listed in Ireland.  However the CSO 
figures only report companies with 5 o r  m o r e  e m p l o y e e s  s o  i s  l i k e l y  t o  
understate the number of companies.  Of this 333 listed by FAS most were 
private limited companies but nearly 4 in 10 were sole traders (table 1).   
 
Table 1: Breakdown of the Irish Contrac t  C l e a n i n g  I n d u s t r y  b y  T y p e  o f  
Ownership. 
Private limited companies  60%: 
Sole traders  38%: 
Public Limited companies  2%: 
FAS (2000)  
 
FAS also estimated that the 10 largest companies account for 80% of the entire 
turnover in the industry.  While 298 firms represent 25% of all cleaning workers.  
This shape of the industry seems to be common across countries but we are 
limited by the lack of studies on the industry.  What probably does differ across   7
countries are the rates of union membership.  It is estimated that 40% of all Irish 
contract cleaners are union members.  However, there seemed to be much 
variation with some companies we interviewed reporting levels below 5%. 
 
Between 1996 & 2002, there was a 12% growth in the numbers of both male and 
female cleaners (CSO 2003).  This growth reflects the increase in economic 
growth (more offices and shops to be cleaned) but could also reflect a shifting 
division of labour between maintenance and cleaning.  The CSO figures broke 
the industry down by gender of employee, it is clear from table two that the 
feminisation rate has increased between 1996 and 2002.  The interviewees claimed 
between 70 and 99% of the workforce where female, which might reflect a 
further horizontal segregation (for instance between companies which 
specialised in cleaning offices or building sites). 
 
Table 2: Feminisation rate CSO Code 968 = cleaners 
 Female 
1996 76% 
2002   82% 
(Window cleaners are not included under the umbrella term for cleaners, but are subsumed 
within category of ‘car park attendants and window cleaners’ (code 955).  In 2002, 656 were 
recorded in relation to both.) 
 
The Contract cleaning industry had a turnover of €152.4 to €190.5 million in 2002 
and this is forecast to double by 2005 (ref).  However the profit margins are very 
small on this typically – 1%-2%.  This indicates that it is a very competitive 
market.  
 
The large companies are members of the British Institute of Cleaning Science 
(BICS)3.  In addition to this 22 of the 320 listed in the CSO are affiliated to The 
Irish Contract Cleaning Association ICCA.  10 of these 22 represent 75-77% of all 
the contract cleaning workers.  Five of these companies belong to The Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC).  The ICCA was set up by several 
contract cleaning companies and IBEC and the administrator of the ICCA is 
employed by IBEC.  However, the ICCA sees itself as independent of IBEC and 
17 members of the ICCA do not belong to IBEC.  This causes some problems of 
co-ordination, but one of the reasons companies created, or joined.  The ICCA 
has a feeling that IBEC does not properly represent their interests.  ICCA 
                                                 
3 This was claimed by several members and report in Rahalen (2004) however I could find no members 
listed on the BICS website.   8
membership requires membership fees, a tax clearance certificate and adherence 
to a code of practice. 
 
The Contract Cleaning Industry is governed by a Joint Labour Committee (JLC) 
which is a statutory body that sets the minimum rates of pay, and other 
conditions of work for the contract cleaning industry.  The JLC, a stationary 
body, has union members, company members and an independent chairman.  
There is one JLC for inside Dublin and one for outside the capital therefore all 
contract cleaners in the country are covered by the standards it sets.  The wage 
rate (presently €7.77) sets the lowest rate for the market, and is presently about 
10% higher than the minimum wage.  The pay and conditions agreed by the JLCs 
are given the force of law in Employment Regulation Orders made by the Labour 
Court on foot of proposals made to the Labour Court by the JLCs.  When 
registered with the Court, Registered Employment Agreements are legally 
binding, not only of the parties to the agreement but also to others who are in the 
class, type or group to which the agreements are expressed to apply.  The JLC 
presently covers 18,000 cleaners (the cleaners not covered would be directly 
employed cleaners and cleaners of domestic residences). 
 
A long –running issue between the union and business representatives on the 
JLC has been the issue of overtime pay.  In 2003 the Chairman of the Labour 
Court asked both the unions and employers to go away and to hold a series of bi-
lateral meetings on overtime payments and agree a common position.  Both sides 
agreed to this; however after this whenever the unions tried to contact the 
employers excuses were made about the difficulty of arranging a meeting.  When 
the next scheduled meeting of the JLC took place the employers told the 
Chairman that they had changed their minds and they would not cooperate over 
the issue of overtime payments.  The Chairman then asked the unions what they 
wanted; it was reported that the unions went out of the room and quickly came 
up with a demand for overtime whenever the cleaner worked more than his or 
her scheduled hours.  The Chairman, frustrated by the actions of the cleaning 
companies, immediately agreed to this.4  As a result of this decision, someone 
who normally worked two hours would have an overtime premium when they 
worked three hours.  The employers argued that this was disastrous for the 
industry because contracts had been agreed with companies and they had no 
possibility of amending these contracts in order to incorporate the new 
regulation.  Therefore if companies were bound by these rules they would run a 
                                                 
4 Some of the contract cleaner owner/managers disagreed with this interpretation and argued that the 
Chairman was not really ‘independent’ and would have sided with the unions regardless of the position the 
companies took.   9
loss on the contracts.  Also it meant that companies would be reluctant to ask for 
overtime from a worker (e.g. to cover the sickness of an absent cleaner) because 
they would have to pay a premium. As a consequence, this meant that cleaners 
would suffer, as the present common practice in the industry is to give overtime 
(paid at flat rates) when there are staff shortages. The employers who were 
represented on the JLC went back and told the other cleaning companies what 
the regulations were going to be and ‘all hell broke loose’.  Companies not 
represented on the JLC claimed that they had no idea that this issue was live nor 
of the actions of the cleaning companies on the JLC and indeed often claimed 
that they would have negotiated with the unions.5 
 
The employers then got together and decided to challenge the JLC, however on 
advice of an IBEC barrister they went to the Equality Authority which has no 
jurisdiction in this area since it only has competence over individual claims.   
About 20 companies then went to the High Court to challenge the order, but 
their case was never on  arbitrated  in the court because the companies were 
judged to be out of time in making their case, (the court hearing was six months 
after the original decision).  14 companies then challenged the High Court 
decision in the Supreme Court but again this latter ruled that they were out of 
time and there was no adequate justification for the delay.  So the companies 
failed to get their case heard because of a combination in slowness in moving and 
bad advice.  At each turn there were divisions within the contract cleaning 
companies on the best way forward, with some companies taking independent 
legal advice and others relying on the services of the main employer body.  This 
delayed action at each turn and contributed to the slowness of getting to court.  
 
This then raises several questions – how come the employers not represented on 
the JLC were unaware of the issues involved?  Why was the grapevine so poor at 
telling the other companies?  When realising the seriousness of the changes for 
their profitability why could the companies not cooperate in time to challenge 
the JLC decision? 
 
When talking to the managers and owners of the cleaning companies it became 
quickly clear that they did not cooperate on any matter: recruitment, training, 
joint bids, etc.  This lack of cooperation was, they argued, due to the precarious 
nature of contract work and the intense rivalry characterising the industry.   
 
                                                 
5 There was an interesting sub-theme discernable among some owner/managers – while they criticised the 
cleaning companies representatives on the JLC, they did not believe it was his or her responsibility to sit on 
this committee.   10
The companies do interact with each other on an inter-organisational level at the 
ICCA.  So the companies do meet with each other.  The inter-personal interaction 
is less noticeable and while there is interaction by people below top management 
level it is denied by those at the very top.  The interaction at middle management 
level is due to people having worked in several companies in the area and built 
up friendships.  Against this owner/managers tend to have started their own 
companies from scratch so have less personal contact with others.  Overall, even 
within the ICCA companies would look upon each other with great suspicion.  
No company reported joint ventures with another company – occasionally one 
company sub-contracted to another company but only if they had no 
geographical presence or technical capacity to do the contract (for instance they 
often subcontracted to firms who specialised in feminine hygiene).  This meant 
that prior to the founding of the ICCA any information about competitors was 
gathered indirectly, mostly through visiting the sites where other companies 
were operating and seeing ‘how things were done’.  Now in addition to this 
‘indirect learning’ about competitors there was also a more direct connection of 
the ICCA which holds an annual award ceremony and dinner and hold regular 
training sessions   However the ICCA does not cover all cleaning companies and 
it estimates that 25% of cleaners are outside ICCA membership.  It was reported 
that there were many ‘Cowboy operators’ not sticking to the JLC standards and 
undercutting the legitimate cleaning companies.  These companies paid no tax or 
PRSI contributions and paid their workers cash in hand.  In addition these 
companies operated with very dubious Health & Safety standards (no harnesses 
for cleaning the windows of high buildings were quoted as an example).  This 
means that the legitimate larger companies always fear being undercut from 
below. 
 
If these companies, who are almost by definition very small, were the only threat 
it might not be too bad.  However, at the same time as the industry is threatened 
by this undercutting from below, one large company was argued to drag down 
the standards for the whole industry by constantly undercutting.   Typically this 
intense competition has lead to the erosion of pay and working conditions across 
the industry in order to preserve firm’s profit margins.  Indeed work has 
highlighted that cleaning firms typically bid for contracts at a very low profit 
margin or even at a loss and ‘recoup’ profits by lowering service levels (Ryan 
2004).  This decrease in service levels can be seen in public building and even 
hospitals which many interviewees said were not as clean as they had been 15 
years ago.  Why do companies located physically close to each other let their 
industry be driven downwards? In order to provide an exhaustive answer to this 
question we must re-examine the proximity literature.   11
Proximity  
The increasing emphasis on ‘proximity’ follows from a recent theoretical 
tendency in regional economics which, while situated in the tradition of the 
industrial district literature (Marshall 1920, 1930; Becattini 2000, 2001; and many 
others) and the innovation milieux literature (Camagni 1991, Maillat 1996), also 
lies at the intersection between industrial economics and spatial economics (Gilly 
and Wallet 2001). More precisely, proximity is part of a continuation of the 
approaches developed in France by the ‘Proximity Dynamics’ group (L’industria 
1998), whose original contribution lies in its desire to endogenise the spatial 
variable within economic theory. The economists of the ‘Proximity Dynamics’ 
group base their reasoning on four main assumptions. First, they stress the 
importance of productive phenomena and, particularly, processes of resource 
creation; second, they suggest that the historical dimension of territorial 
trajectories should be taken into account; third, they emphasise the role of 
interactions through collective learning process in the emergence of territories; 
finally, they stress the importance of institutions – understood as grouping of 
shared formal and informal representations and constraining the actors to 
different degrees – in explaining territorial dynamics. Starting from this basis, the 
work of these economists has isolated three major dimensions of proximity: 1) 
institutional proximity, which defines the field of representations and frames of 
reference shared by the actors; 2) organisational proximity, which accounts for 
the existence of interactions between the actors in the context of solving a 
production-related problem through collective action; and 3) geographical 
proximity, which integrates the spatial dimension by relying on Perraux’s 
concept of geonomic space (for an exhaustive discussion of the ‘French school’ 
see Gilly & Wallet 2001)  
 
Nowhere is the assumption that spatial proximity supports inter-firm 
cooperation, collective learning and innovation more prominent than in the 
literature on industrial clusters and to a greater extent in the literature of 
industrial districts (Dei Ottati 1987; Storper 1997) Within this strand of literature, 
a critical theme is the role ‘space’ and the extent to which it can trigger 
cooperation and in particular interactive learning as well as innovation between 
firms.  Space is taken as synonymous with geographical proximity, such that 
physical nearness is taken to be a necessary and often sufficient condition for 
inter-firm cooperation, such that many studies of successful industrial clusters 
often ‘find’ geographical proximity as a main driver for clustering. Within this 
context, innovation is thought to occur more easily in situation of geographic 
proximity – innovation activities benefit from a concentration of economic   12
activities by similar and related firms in a cluster, which facilitate knowledge 
spilllovers and stimulate various forms of adaptation, imitation, learning and 
innovation (Enright 1998).  Malberg and Maskell, for instance point out how ‘in 
such environment, chances are greater than an individual firm will get in touch 
with actors that have developed or been early adapters of new technology. The 
flow of industry-related information and knowledge is generally more abundant, 
to the advantage of all firms involved’ (Malberg & Maskell, 2002 p.433). The 
main argument here is that the localisation of an industry with many firms 
competing in the same sector or cooperating across related industries tend to 
trigger dynamism and flexibility as well as learning and innovation. 
 
What is striking and to some extent surprising is that how and why this 
geographical proximity induces cooperation is often taken for granted.  This 
linkage of cooperation and geographic proximity has been recently questioned 
and re-examined (Staber, 2001; Lublinski 2003 ). Gilly and Wallet (2001) tackle 
this issue by introducing an approach that mobilises a plural definition of 
proximity – institutional, organisational and geographical – in their attempt to 
endogenize space in economic analysis. Similarly, Boschma (2005a) argues that 
geographical proximity cannot be looked at in isolation and there are other 
dimensions of proximity that may provide different resolutions to the 
coordination problem. These are cognitive, organisational, social, institutional 
and geographical proximity.  Fusion of these different types of proximity has 
lead to confusion about the role of space and geography in previous studies 
(Torre and Rallett 2005).Boschma (2005a) as well as Torre and Rallett (2005) 
argue that these five individually or in combination can promote cooperation 
and innovation at the same time avoiding the problem of lock-in.  We use these 
other types of proximity to analyse why the cleaning companies, which are 
geographically co-located do not cooperate.  We start by looking at each of the 
types of proximity in turn (table 2) we then apply this analytical framework to 
the contract cleaning companies before finally teasing out the benefits of using 
the latter to explain clusters’ interactional dynamics. 
 
Boschma (2005a) details five different types of proximity: cognitive, 
organisational, social, institutional and geographical.  His definitions of each are 
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Table 2 - the five types of proximity 
 




A firm’s ‘cognitive base should be close enough to the new knowledge in order 
to communicate, understand and process it successfully’ P. 63 
Organisational  The extent to which relations are shared in an organizational arrangement, 
either within or between organizations.  To be precise, this involves the rate of 
autonomy and the degree of control that can be exerted over arrangements.  P. 
65 
Social  Social proximity is defined here in terms of socially embedded relations 
between agents at the micro-level.  Relations between actors are socially 
embedded when they involve trust based on friendship, kinship and 
experience.  Accordingly, the definition of social proximity does not include 
situations in which people share sets of values, such as ethnic and religious 
values.  Aspect of cultural proximity at a more macro-level will be associated 
with the notion of institutional proximity below.  P. 66 
Institutional  Following the distinction between formal and informal institutions, the notion 
of institutional proximity includes both the idea of economic between actors 
sharing the same institutional rules of the game, as well as a set of cultural 
habits and values A common language, shared habits, a law system securing 
ownership and intellectual property rights, etc., all provide a basis for 
economic coordination and interactive learning. 
P. 68 
Geographical  The spatial or physical distance between economic actors, both in its absolute 




That actors are subject to bounded rationality has long been known (Simon 1955). 
Actors have cognitive constraints that make it impossible for them to act in a 
globally optimal way (Crocco 2000; Möllering 2003).  However, to be able to act 
in this un-computatable world – actors have to act if there is relative certainty.  
This is facilitated by actors following routinized behaviours – homo oeconomicus 
does what he/she has always done. According to mainstream organisational 
evolutionists, cognitive proximity refers to the importance of organisational 
routines (Nelson & Winter 1982) and social representations such as market 
reputations, mental models as well as conceptions of control (Porac & Rosa 1996). 
Within this context of market uncertainty, cognitive proximity provides the 
social knowledge that resolves market ambiguities as well as the language for 
describing, defining and interpreting firms’ activities (Porac & Rosa 1996).  
   14
The underlying assumption of the advocates of the cognitive approach is that the 
development of modes of coordination is nothing more than a cognitive 
phenomenon of a routine-changing type (Gilly & Wallet, 2001). Only when actors 
encounter a problem do they seek solutions, or different ways of doing things – 
and for this new knowledge – they look close to their existing knowledge base.  
Actors with too disparate knowledge bases find it difficult to communicate 
information to each other.  To be effective communicators the firms must be 
cognitively close (Nooteboom 2003).  They must speak the same cognitive 
language. Therefore, within this context cognitive proximity enables firms to 
interact, to revisit their mutual knowledge base and to exploit the latter in order 
to introduce new organisational routines. However, when firms are too close in 
terms of cognitive proximity, paradoxically their dialogue tends to be impaired.  
Boschma (2005a) argues that this is for three reasons, first, knowledge building 
often requires dissimilar, complementary bodies of knowledge, if the firms are 
too close then the knowledge bases are likely to be too similar.  Second, firms 
which are too close in terms of cognitive proximity may be unable to see new 
opportunities – this is the well know ‘competency trap’, firms who have done 
things in a relatively successful way find it difficult to abandon their existing 
routines and adopt new ones.  Third, if firms are too close in terms of cognitive 




Organisational proximity is often associated with economic coordination 
characterised by trust-based relations among actors. This form of proximity is 
often regarded as necessary to foster coordination and cooperation by lowering 
transaction costs, to facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge and thus, learning 
and innovation.  
 
Previous work on proximity had using conflated organisational proximity with 
institutional proximity. Kirat and Lung (1995) drawing on the distinction 
between institutions and organisations, associate the former with ‘the rules of the 
game’ and the latter with the ‘players’. In this perspective, organisational 
proximity links actors who are participating in a goal-oriented activity in the 
context of a particular structure. According to Gilly and Wallet (2001) this form 
of proximity relies on coherence in the configuration of relations between agents, 
stemming from a common cognitive framework which is built on institutional 
proximity. Thus, there is a principle of hierarchy between institutions and 
organisations, whereas the former lead the latter. Where there is a failure of 
coordination, organisations are likely to question the collective reference points   15
that orient the collective action.  This retroactive process forms the basis for the 
mechanism of institutional change.   
 
Other studies have often treated organisational proximity to include a cognitive 
dimension (Gilly and Torre, 2000). Boschma (2005a) separates the cognitive and 
organisational for analytical purposes to highlight that organisational form 
hinders or promotes cooperation and therefore innovation.  That is the actors 
may speak a similar language but their financial or economic independence or 
dependence may hinder interaction as well as cooperation to foster further 
innovation.  For instance one firm may be contracted exclusively to a third party.  
From someone from a heterodox economics background this separation of 
organisational and cognitive proximity may seem a little artificial – but 
separating the two concepts allows a differentiation between a general 
background in common and a common specific organisational form.  Again 
Boschma details how too closeness due to organisational proximity can stifle 
innovation as firms get locked into specific exchange relations and asymmetric 
relations can lead to hold up problems, the organisation may lack feedback 
mechanisms or flexibility (2005a).  Attempting to break the stranglehold of too 
tightly coupled organisations can lead to problems with vested interests.   
Likewise too little organisational proximity between organisations can mean that 
firms risk opportunism.  The optimal combination is a loose coupling that allows 
flexibility by preserving organisational autonomy, but at the same time avoids 
red tape by reducing formal obligations.  
 
Social proximity 
A related concept is social proximity and it is taken from the ideas of Granovetter 
(1985) among others on the social embeddedness of economic action and that 
social ties affect economic outcomes. Social proximity refers to the importance of 
where an actor comes from, considering the societal background or ‘genetic 
code’, influencing and shaping the actions of individuals (Hess, 2004). Within 
this context, space is seen as a socially-constructed object, favouring interactions 
yet not indispensable to the various forms of coordination, thus ‘the idea of 
proximity is an integral part of an essentially relational concept of economic 
reality: it refers to both the separation of individual or collective agents and the 
relations that bring them closer (and/or distance them) in solving an economic 
problem’ (Gilly and Wallet, 2001: 555). The basic insight of theory of 
embeddedness has been that the structure of relations between actors is of crucial 
importance for the explanation of economic outcomes. Uzzi for instance contends 
that socially embedded relations have three main components that regulate the 
expectations and behaviour of exchange partners: trust, fine-grained information   16
transfer as well as joint-problem solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1997). According to 
Uzzi, these components are conceptually independent, though related because 
they are all elements of social interaction. Yet, because of these components, 
social proximity provides three main economic outcomes. First, social proximity 
promotes economies of time – contracting times and costs are avoided because 
firms trust that payoffs will be divided equitably; fine-grained information 
transfer speeds data exchange and helps firms to understand each other’s 
organisational routines so that collective decision-making can be quickened; joint 
problem-solving arrangements also increase the speed at which product are 
brought to the market by resolving problems in real time during production. 
Second, social proximity assists complex adaptation because actors can better 
identify and execute coordinated solutions to organisational problems. Third, 
social proximity generates Pareto improvements by promoting a reallocation of 
resources that makes at least one actor better off without making anyone worse 
off (Uzzi, 1997). 
 
As a result, too much social proximity and actors tend to leave themselves open 
to opportunism – too little and both cooperation and therefore innovation are 
hindered by a lack of trust. The same process by which social proximity creates 
several coordination mechanisms – a requisite fit with the current environment – 
can paradoxically turn itself into a liability. According to Uzzi, three conditions 
can turn socially embedded relations into a liability. First, the sudden loss of a 
network’s core actor or a deep unexpected structural change in resource flows 
can increase the vulnerability of networked organisations. Too much social 
proximity, in this case presents itself as the opposite of the free-rider problem – 
‘diligent commitment, backed by expectations of reciprocity and social pressure 
to perform, intensifies an organization’s involvement with certain network 
partners while raising the concomitant costs of keeping ties to extra-network 
partners that can provide a safety net for unexpected or random fluctuations’ 
(Uzzi, 1997: 57). Second, institutional arrangement that rationalize markets or 
fracture social ties can also cause instability. If major changes occur and as a 
result social ties are broken, then the benefits of social proximity can be lost. This 
obviously place firms that invested heavily in social ties at higher risk of failure 
than market-oriented firms because the social proximity that created and 
supported competitive advantage no longer exist (Uzzi, 1997). Third, by the same 
process by which social proximity facilitates innovation, it can also reduce the 
flow of new and novel information because redundant ties to the same partners 
mean that there are a few or no links to outside actors who can potentially 
contribute by bringing in innovative ideas (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997).  In this sense, 
the relations among the actors become ossified and irresponsive to the demands   17
of the external environment, ultimately leading to decline. Too much social 
proximity can also stifle effective economic action if the social aspects of 
exchange supersede the economic imperatives. Whereas strong assumptions of 
trust and cooperation are exploited, vendettas can arise. Social proximity turns 
itself into a liability because it creates intense negative emotions of spite and 
revenge that trap actors in self-defeating behaviours. Over time these actions can 
prevail against rational action and reduce the firms ability to meet the 
requirements of the market (Uzzi, 1996). Following Uzzi’s paradox of 
embeddedness, Boschma (2005a) proposes an inverted-U relationship between 
social proximity and innovative behaviour at the firm level. More precisely, the 
social dimension of economic relations has a positive influence on the 
performance of a firm up to a certain threshold after which this positive influence 
loses its impact when the embedded relations become too closely tied.  
 
Institutional proximity 
Whereas social proximity is generally considered as a form of proximity at the 
micro-level, institutional proximity is often regarded at macro-level. Within this 
bulk of work economic activity is organised through institutions with the 
institutions themselves anchored in wider political arrangements and cultural 
systems of meaning (Hamilton, 1994). Two streams of work are important here. 
The first is a set of arguments that is historical, political, and cultural in nature 
where the organisations assume different organisational arrangements and 
implement specific routines as the result of imprinting by wider polity 
arrangements and their impact on conception of industry and market 
rationalities (Biggart and Orru, 1997). The second stream of work focuses on 
processes of field structuration, with an emphasis on coordination mechanisms 
within an arena of institutional life, stratification regimes, social movement 
processes as well as struggle over identities and resources (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Powell, 1996).    
 
Biggart and Orru argue that ‘the institutional environment creates background 
factors that precede and logically shape both comparative and competitive 
strategic action’ (1997: 127). In this sense different institutional frameworks affect 
the transaction costs of doing business by reducing uncertainty and providing 
incentive systems for finding solutions to conflict (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
More over, some institutional systems are thought to have different levels of 
adaptive efficiency that permit prompt and effective adjustment to dramatic 
changes in the market. The theoretical discourse has been developed around two 
levels of analysis.   18
 
At macro-level, debates over whether industrialised societies are converging 
toward a particular form of capitalism have permeated many branches of social 
science since the 1960s. Comparative studies of national models of capitalism 
have emerged across a wide range of disciplines, including geography, 
sociology, politics and economics. More recently, Michael Albert’s ‘Capitalism 
vs. Capitalism’ (1991) drawing sketches of ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Nippo-
Rhenish’ models, has launched the debate over the societal foundations of 
economic performance. By linking institutional theory to transaction cost 
economics, new institutional economics attempts to provide an explanation as to 
how different institutional frameworks affect the cost of undertaking economic 
activities. The common intuition underlying the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature 
is that economic performance is a characteristic of firms meant not as 
autonomous actors but as social creations, highly dependent on external societal 
resources. Firms in the same sector, with the availability of similar technology 
and products will differ systematically across societies according to the kinds of 
resources and institutional frameworks that those societies provide for them. In 
this perspective, different kind of industrial societies, different institutional 
configurations or forms of production generate systematically different outcomes 
to the extent that it is possible to deduce a theory of comparative institutional 
advantage (Berger & Locke, 2001).  
 
At micro-level, the debate has focused on those aspects of the local economic 
system which yield enabling factors for business development activity. Issues of 
local competitiveness have been assessed in terms of the importance of local 
institutional factors in encouraging or impeding the development of self-
boosting ‘regional milieux’ and related virtuous circles of innovation (Amin & 
Thrift, 1994; Maillat, 1996). According to this strand of literature, ‘institutional 
thickness’ helps to embed firms in specific localities and to reduce their 
tendencies for relocation (Amin & Thrift, 1994). Strong institutional presence 
therefore lowers the risk for ‘hollowing out’ as a result of environmental 
transformations that globalisation encompasses as well as inducing new firms 
formation and growth, and it further enhances the competitiveness of existing 
firms (Yeung, 2000). Furthermore, the greater social cohesion at the basis of the 
adaptability which fuels the continuous regeneration of industrial clusters’ 
competitiveness is not an entirely spontaneous outcome. On the contrary, social 
cohesion is typically the result of conscious concerted action among different 
local institutions (Dei Ottati, 2002).  
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A strong institutional presence for instance can play a role in supporting 
industrial growth and innovation (Rabellotti, 1997). The role of public policy in 
the Italian and other European industrial districts has received great attention in 
the literature. Particular emphasis has been devoted to the role of regional and 
local governments in providing a framework in which industrial districts can 
flourish and being nurtured (Brusco, 1990; Best, 1990). There is some evidence for 
example that the growth of the Italian districts has benefited from a national 
regulatory framework which provides financial facilities and exemptions from 
administrative burdens for artisans (Rabellotti, 1997). Consistently, this literature 
also accords a key role to a particular set of private institutions such as business 
associations, trade organisations and chambers of commerce. These private 
sector institutions have both the potential and the capacity to promote a sense of 
shared group identity and to strengthen the voice of local firms (Yeung, 2000). In 
many cases entrepreneurial associations and other institutions such as business 
service centres also have played a significant role in the provisions of services. 
Example of services provided are the supply of information, quality control and 
testing facilities, entrepreneurial and managerial training, translation of tenders, 
consultancy on fiscal and legal matters, book-keeping and research on foreign 
markets (Pike et. al., 1990). Most importantly, the institutional presence seemed 
to have the capacity to upgrade districts’ production along the ever-fast pace of 
innovation and increasing competition, driving the districts forward (Kaplinsky, 
2000; Schmitz, 2000). Overall, a tight collaboration between public and private 
bodies in the definition of firms’ needs and in the implementation of the 
institutional initiatives has been crucial in determining the degree of success of 
industrial districts (Rabellotti, 1997; Schmitz, 2000).  
 
Conversely too much ‘institutional thickness’ nonetheless is not necessarily 
beneficial for localised firms (Yeung, 2000). Scott for instance argues that ‘not all 
forms of institutional thickness provide an automatic guarantee of economic 
dynamism’ (Scott, 1998: 110).  Boschma similarly endorses the assumption that 
by the same process by which institutional proximity facilitates cooperation and 
trust, yet too much institutional proximity can impede collective learning and 
interlocking institutions can cause local inertia (Boschma, 2005a). On the other 
hand, Boschma acknowledges that too little institutional proximity might be 
harmful to collective action and innovation due to a lack of social cohesion and 
weak formal institutions (Boschma, 2005a).  
 
Geographical proximity 
According to Gilly and Wallet (2001) geographical proximity cannot be reduced 
to mere physical proximity, measurable in terms of physical distance. Notably it   20
has a social dimension because it brings time into the analysis. Because of 
globalisation, distance no longer has an absolute value, but it a function of the 
time needed to travel across it. Due to this feature, geographical proximity 
encompasses elements such as transport or communication infrastructures, 
which according to both their degree of development and level of utilisation, can 
modify coordination mechanisms (Torre and Rallet, 2005).  
 
However, there is a huge bulk of work on industrial clusters that claims that 
actors that are spatially concentrated can benefit from positive externalities.  The 
literature on small firm networks in industrial districts postulates the importance 
of territorial proximity for cooperation and business innovation, but empirical 
research to test this preposition is sparse. While there is some research on the 
extent of inter-firm cooperation, little is known about the performance outcome 
of cooperation (i.e. innovation). 
 
Locational and spatial factors lead to a trade-off between transport costs, size of 
the market and trade barriers. These geographical factors lead to a generation of 
proximity benefits as well as incentives to disperse. The advantages of spatial 
proximity are extensively investigated by the literature from Weber’s ‘Theory of 
the Location of Industries’ (1928) to most recent approaches.  Space is therefore 
nested in the definition of clusters and reducing transport and transaction costs 
are generally regarded as the main benefits that geographical proximity 
encompasses (Yeung, 2000). This type of evolution appears to be dominant in 
many localities where the existence of factors such as a natural harbour or a 
navigable river leads to geographical concentration of firms engaged in activities 
that require low-cost transport systems. By accident, these firms discover the 
benefits of locating close to firms engaged in similar types of operations and a 
process of clustering spontaneously emerges (Krugman, 1996). The existence of 
favourable geographical conditions that are conducive to good transport system 
and densely populated areas are however not sufficient to generate industrial 
clusters. In this respect, geographical factors per se, cannot be regarded as a key 
feature of clusters’ creation and growth (Schmitz, 1990; Rabellotti, 1997). 
Historical events and institutional factors that are conducive to clustering 
provide the setting in which it is possible to reach proximity benefits.  
 
Similarly Torre and Rallet (2005) endorse the assumption that geographical 
proximity cannot alone generate synergies and it cannot create interactions 
between actors at local level. It facilitates interactions but does not in itself 
facilitate coordination. Lublinski analyses what type of inter-firm linkages are 
stronger between geographically proximate firms compared to distant firms   21
(Lublinski, 2003). The findings suggest that geographical proximity is relevant 
for inter-firm linkages that may lead to the following outcomes: labour market 
pooling; knowledge spillovers; demanding local customers and trust-based 
effects. However the results of this study are not sufficient to prove or disprove 
the theoretical arguments of agglomeration advantages. 
 
The literature of industrial districts takes a systemic approach and draws 
attention to the positive externalities stemming from co-location. Following a 
recent trend in industrial and urban development, some researchers distinguish 
between two types of externalities: economies of localisation and economies of 
urbanisation. Staber affirms that in mature industries firms benefit from being 
close to other in the same industry as geographical proximity brings economies 
of localisation through shared pool of qualified labour, specialised suppliers, 
communication infrastructures and so forth (Staber 2001).  In emerging 
industries or industries experiencing rapid change, firms benefit from being close 
to other operating in different industries because geographical proximity brings 
urbanisation economies – or so called ‘Jacobs externalities’ through exposure to 
different ideas and competencies (Jacobs, 1969).  According to Staber, most 
empirical studies of inter-firm relations in industrial districts do not address this 
distinction and are silent on its implications for assessing industrial district 
performance (i.e. cooperation or innovation). The implicit assumption that 
constituent firms benefit although to a different degree from being close one to 
another needs to be tested.  Proximity in fact may not only encourage 
cooperation, but may also intensify direct competition and push less fit firms out 
of the market depending on the type of externalities present in any given 
situation (Staber, 2001). 
 
As for innovation, geographical proximity has been shown to be important 
because over short distances people get together and exchange information and 
tacit knowledge – the further apart people are the intensity and frequency of 
these contacts declines (Grabher 2001;  Lawson and Lorenz 1999). Again there is 
a balance to be struck – is geographical proximity a sufficient condition to 
produce innovation and not only to diffuse it? As the most recent studies on 
innovation clusters has shown (Porter 1998), the idea that firms benefit from the 
spatial concentration of their research and innovation activities, is widely 
accepted – geographical proximity is seen as an essential condition for 
technological success, especially in the case of small firms (Gallaud and Rherrad, 
2002).  However, whereas some researches take for granted that geographic 
proximity plays part in the process of innovation and the transmission of 
knowledge, studies on geographical externalities attempt to verify the role of this   22
proximity in the transmission of knowledge by calculating the maximum 
distance that a technological externality could potentially cover (Feldman 1999, 
Wallsten, 2001). All these approaches come to the conclusion that the 
geographical extension of externalities is limited and this supports the idea that 
geographic proximity does play a role in the diffusion of knowledge.  
 
Some authors take this argument further, Bathelt et. al. (2004) for instance 
questions the view that tacit knowledge transfer is confined within geographical 
proximity whereas codified knowledge may roam the globe almost frictionlessy. 
To this end, they make a distinction between the learning processes taking place 
among actors embedded in a community by just being there – ‘dubbed buzz’ – 
and the knowledge obtained by investing and building channel of 
communication – ‘pipelines’ – to selected actors located outside the local 
community. It is argued that the coexistence of high levels of dubbed buzz and 
many pipelines may provide firms located in outward-looking and dynamic 
clusters with a string of specific advantages not available to outsiders. ‘The buzz 
encourages the development of shared values, attitude and interpretative 
schemes, typical for communities of practice, which enable the local actors to 
engage in interactive learning and problem-solving, and give meaning to 
complex information about changes in the market and in technologies’ (Bathelt 
et. al., 2004: 45). While a well-developed system of pipelines connecting the local 
cluster to the rest of the world brings two main benefits. First, ‘new and valuable 
knowledge will always be created in other parts of the world and firms who can 
build pipelines to such sites of global excellence can gain competitive advantage’ 
(Bathelt et. al., 2004: 46). Second, ‘it seems reasonable to assume that the 
information that one cluster firm can acquire through its pipelines will spill over 
to other firms in the cluster through local buzz’ (Bathelt et. al., 2004: 46).        
 
Boshma takes a further step along this line by questioning the role that 
geographical proximity can play, taking into consideration possible 
complementarities/substitutional effects as well as synergies between different 
types of proximity (Boshma’s 2005a). Within this context, he asserts that 
geographical proximity combined with some level of cognitive proximity is 
sufficient for interactive learning to take place. However he also recognises that 
other forms of proximity may also act as substitute for geographical proximity. 
Thus, interactive learning may be enhanced by geographical proximity but too 
much geographical proximity may also be harmful for interactive learning and 
innovation.   Boshma’s however contends that an optimal degree of geographical 
proximity exists - too close and firms risk a lack of openness to the outside world 
and too far and firms lose spatial externalities (Boshma’s 2005a), hence the   23
reference to goldilocks in the title. In the former case, he suggests that spatial 
lock-in may be solved or prevented by either diversifying the local economy by 
building so-called Jacobs externalities, or by establishing non-local linkages. 
 
Goldilocks - Adopting Boshma’s Taxonomy 
 
Overall, a key criticism of Bosnma’s paper is that in the desire to careful delineate 
the different types of proximity he has over-defined these concepts.  So for 
instance the separation of social and cognitive can seem a little an artificial – so 
can the separation of organisational and institutional. Conversely, he also 
acknowledges that ‘it is often difficult to detangle geographical proximity from 
other forms of proximity. Geographical proximity may stimulate them, as is the 
case with social and cognitive proximity. Apart from this complementary 
relationship, other forms of proximity may also function as substitutes for 
geographical proximity’ (Boshma 2005a: 70).  However, by adopting this 
taxonomy it is possible to use these different concepts to discover why firms 
cooperate and more importantly for this paper why they do not. 
 
Table 3. Five forms of proximity: some features 
 













2. Organizational   Control   Opportunism   Bureaucracy   Loosely 
coupled system 
3. Social   Trust (based on 
social relations) 






4. Institutional   Trust (based on 
common 
institutions) 





5. Geographical  Distance  No spatial externalities  Lack of 
geographical 
openness 
Mix of local 
‘buzz’ and 
extra- local 
linkages   
Boschma (ref ***)  P. 71 
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In conclusion this new stream of reasoning on proximity is that cognitive, 
organisational, social and institutional proximity all have a role to play in 
shaping different coordination mechanisms, such as cooperation and innovation 
between companies.  In some circumstances these different types of proximity 
may be a reasonable substitute for the geographical proximity in different 
combinations the different types of proximity may promote innovation  - 
physical closeness on its own is nether a sufficient or necessary condition nor for 
cooperation or innovation.  So for instance, geographical proximity in 
combination with social proximity may be sufficient for innovation, or social and 
cognitive and institutional and cognitive and so on.  But for each type of 
proximity the actors must not be too close or too far apart. 
 
The three bears - Proximity and the cleaning companies  
Using this framework we look at the Irish contract cleaning industry to see if this 
can provide an explanation of why the firms – though situated close to one 
another – did not cooperate.  We look at each of the proximity criteria in turn. 
 
Cognitive proximity 
As mentioned above the management and owners of the cleaning companies 
shared a common cognitive framework – but in several senses this was too close.  
First they all shared a vision of competition which was cut throat, based on 
under-cutting the competition and the belief that they could not do anything 
about this as smaller firms would come in, under cut and take away their work.  
Several times it was expressed that it was illegitimate to cooperate and that 
cooperation was somehow not paying the game.  So for example the companies 
accepted year-on-year decreases in the contract payments by state services 
because they felt it would be illegitimate to make a stand and say ‘this hospital 
need x hours cleaning’. 
 
Underlying this notion was that they were atomistic players whose only decision 
lay in setting the price level and they had no (nor should have) any control over 
setting quality standards for the industry.  There were two internal 
contradictions in their discourse of free market competition.  First many 
interviewees said they would welcome an outsider setting quality standards for 
the industry.  Second, many interviews could point the existence of market-
leadership led by a couple of firms.  These firms were in a market leadership 
position simply based on their large size – they could afford to loss-lead on a 
contract.  The second way in which the cleaning firms were too cognitively close 
is that they were often competing for the same business.  This meant that the   25
innovations the companies adopted for non-price competition were all the same.  
They all recognised the importance of clean presentable staff and argued that 
their staff were best in this regard.  They usually had very professional logos 
(which often referred to a heraldic symbol).  Many firms were moving into 
facilities management and providing integrated packages of mail room services, 
security and cleaning. Finally many had worked for and won an ISO award 
though they thought it had brought them no additional business.  In addition, 
with a few exceptions – they all belonged to the employers’ body and took 
advice and information from that body on legal and employment matters.  Here 
then is a classic case of firms which are too close to innovate but fear getting 
wider apart becaue they think that position would not be legitimate (Oerlemans 
and Meeus 2005) 
 
All these factors indicate that the cognitive distance between the companies was 
too narrow.  The firms simply lacked a source of novelty that would allow them 
to differentiate and advance their sector.  
 
Organizational proximity 
There was no organisational proximity, as reported above. There was no form of 
coordination between companies characterised by trust-based relations among 
actors - no company reported joint ventures or cooperating on a contract bid 
with another company.  The only inter-firm cooperation was when one company 
sub-contracted to another company, however this was very rare and only 
happened if the parent company had no workers in the area or no in-house 
technical capacity (for instance in cleaning escalators).  Even when the severe 
labour shortages in the early 2000s meant that firms did not tender for work 
because they thought they would be unable to fulfil the contract the firms did not 
even consider putting in joint bids with other labour-strapped firms.  This meant 
that firms were inhibited from growing because of their fear that opportunistic 
behaviours could arise. 
 
Social proximity 
The main players in the industry reported never socialising with each other – 
and even avoiding the main trade fairs that they thought their competitors 
attended.  This avoidance of contact was because of fear of opportunism by the 
other company (if the company found information on costing then they could 
use this to undercut the company).  This suspicion has been ameliorated with the 
formation of the ICCA and the introduction of an annual dinner and award 
ceremony.  However, this contact has not yet conquered the fear of opportunism 
in the minds of owners and managers.    26
Institutional proximity  
We mentioned that Biggart and Orru affirms ‘the institutional environment 
creates background factors that precede and logically shape both comparative 
and competitive strategic action’ (1997: 127). In this context different institutional 
frameworks affect the transaction costs of doing business by reducing 
uncertainty and providing incentive systems for finding solutions to conflict 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
By adopting Boshma’s framework, this failure of coordination among the 
cleaning companies could be explained by the presence of too little institutional 
proximity, which in this case was detrimental to collective action and produced a 
lack of social cohesion and common values. Since we have seen how institutional 
proximity is strongly linked with other forms of proximity, the lack of social 
proximity of the cleaning companies prevented also any coherent initiative to be 
taken.  
Discussion 
Boshma’s framework has been useful in exploring why cooperation doesn’t 
happen as much as why innovation does happen.  Using this framework it is 
possible to see that the contract cleaning companies while they are spatial 
proximate are unlikely to innovate or even t o  c o o p e r a t e .   T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  o n  
many different dimensions they are either too close or too far apart (see table **).  
For this group of companies ideas for differentiating themselves from other 
companies are all drawn from the same well.  Because they all shared a strong 
ideological commitment to free market competition the firms feared 
opportunism and therefore did not form joint ventures with each other or even 
socialise with each other.  That is the overwhelming close cognitive proximity 
‘crowed out’ any other types of proximity. 
 
Proximity  The contract cleaning companies
Cognitive   Too close together 
Organizational  Too far apart 
Social  Too far part 
Institutional  Too far apart 
Geographic Close   
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Conclusion 
Goldilocks was a fussy madam; she didn’t want things too big or too small, too 
hot or too cold, too hard or too soft.  Everything had to be ‘just right’. 
 
Boshma’s framework has proved a useful way to start investigations into 
proximity and the ‘just right’ conditions for cooperation and innovation.   
However while he recognises that different types of proximity can be substitutes 
for each other – he fails to recognise that there may be a crowding out effect if 
one type is too strong (or possibly too weak).  So for instance the competition 
among spatially close actors can cause competition for scarce resources (Torre 
and Rallett 2005).  So in the case of the contract cleaners in Dublin – an 
overwhelmingly claustrophobic cognitive proximity ruled out other types of 
proximity from developing. This leads us to assume that there might be an 
evolutionary theory of proximity that invokes the biological metaphor of natural 
selection. Within this context, a crucial question that needs to be addressed is 
whether different forms of proximity change/develop over time and to more 
extent how mechanisms such as variation, selection and retention could be used 
to explain the ‘crowding out’ effect mentioned above. 
 
This framework also allows solutions to be explored.  For instance in the case 
reported here – either a breakdown of the cognitive claustrophobia must be 
achieved by the companies if they are to cooperate effectively in future or there 
must be a concerted effort to increase organisational and social proximity to 
overcome the firms fear of opportunism.  In this case the creation of the Irish 
Contract Cleaning Association and the development of awards and an annual 
social event is a good start.  Without a closing of some of these other distances, 
spatial proximity will not create innovation or even cooperation.  Without this 
the contract cleaning companies in Dublin will be more like the three bears –
getting what is left over rather than like goldilocks –having the best pick. 
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